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Abstract 
 
Expected Firm Performance and IPO Price Formation 
 
by 
 
Bradley Eric Hendricks 
 
Chair: Gregory S. Miller 
 
 
This study examines how accounting information influences investors’ evaluations of 
IPO firms. Specifically, I examine whether a simple financial statement analysis process 
that provides information about the future prospects of IPO firms is useful in explaining 
the investor feedback that issuing firms receive during the bookbuilding portion of the 
IPO process. I find that this information about an IPO firm’s prospects is not fully 
captured in the price that the underwriter proposes for the offering and that investors 
use the bookbuilding process to adjust the proposed price to more fully reflect this 
information. I also show that investors’ use of this accounting information improves the 
accuracy of IPO pricing. Finally, I show that this information is more likely to be fully 
impounded into the final offer price when there is greater participation from 
institutional investors in the bookbuilding process. These findings highlight the value 
that investors associate with an IPO firm’s accounting information and reveal that the 
price revision is much more predictable than suggested by the extant literature. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is one of the most important events in a public firm’s life 
cycle. Despite this importance, Wysocki (2007) notes that “the accounting literature on 
this topic remains in its infancy.”1 The goal of this paper is to further our understanding 
about how accounting information influences investors' evaluations of IPO firms. 
Specifically, I use a simple financial statement analysis process to examine whether an 
accounting-based signal about the future prospects of IPO firms is useful in explaining 
the price revision that occurs during the bookbuilding portion of the IPO process. By 
focusing on the price revision, rather than the final offer price, I am able to isolate the 
investor feedback received during IPO price formation and identify how accounting 
information influences that feedback. 
 Understanding the price revision is important for several reasons. First, the price 
revision directly impacts a firm’s cost of equity capital. Because issuing firms anchor on 
the midpoint of the proposed pricing range (Loughran and Ritter, 2002), the price 
revision represents the difference between the issuing firm’s expected cost of equity 
capital and its actual cost of equity capital. Second, an underwriter’s credibility depends 
on its equity marketing history (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Thus, the price 
                                                        
1 Similarly, Charles Lee (2001) notes that IPOs are a topic that has “traditionally been the domain of corporate 
finance or investments, even though accounting information plays an important role in [this] decision context.”  
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revision directly influences an underwriter’s reputational capital.2 Third, Ritter (2011) 
identifies the price revision as the single variable with the greatest explanatory power of 
firms’ initial returns. Accordingly, a greater understanding of the price revision is likely 
to yield a better understanding of this heavily researched topic (Ritter and Welch 2002). 
 I expect that a firm’s future prospects, as signaled by its accounting information, 
will influence the price revision due to the incentives that are inherent when firms issue 
equity. Specifically, issuing firms have a strong incentive to maximize the proceeds they 
receive in exchange for their shares. Aware of this, underwriters vying to be selected to 
lead a potential IPO firm’s offering may attempt to increase the probability of being 
selected to lead the offering by proposing a valuation suggesting that the firm has 
abnormally strong growth prospects. While some IPO firms may indeed have future 
prospects that justify a high valuation, the competitive underwriter selection process 
likely leads many IPO firms to be marketed as having future prospects that exceed their 
actual prospects. Consistent with this conjecture, the majority of firms that go public 
either price below the midpoint of the underwriter’s proposed pricing range or elect to 
withdraw their offering during the registration process.3  
 If each firm comes to market with a proposed price reflecting strong future 
performance then the information that investors use to determine these firms’ actual 
                                                        
2 While theory has assumed this relationship when constructing models of underwriter reputation, no prior 
empirical evidence exists to support this statement. Accordingly, I examine this relationship empirically as one 
of the additional analyses included in Chapter 6 of this paper. Consistent with the assumed relationship, I show 
that an underwriter’s future market share is increasing in the average price revision of the firms that the 
underwriter has historically brought to market. 
3 Specifically, approximately 60% of the firms in my sample (IPOs from 2001 – 2007) either withdrew an offering 
or priced below the midpoint of the proposed pricing range. Similar distributions have also been observed for 
earlier time periods (Lowry and Schwert, 2004). Refer to Appendix B for additional commentary regarding the 
competitive nature of the underwriter selection process. 
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future prospects should be useful in predicting the price revision. That is, a firm that 
presents investors with information that corroborates the firm’s strong future prospects 
is more likely to maintain its proposed valuation than is a firm without supporting 
information. Consistent with investors using a firm’s accounting information to 
determine these firms’ future prospects, I find that an accounting-based signal about an 
IPO firm’s future prospects is positively associated with the investor feedback that 
issuing firms receive during the bookbuilding portion of the IPO process. I also show 
that investors’ reliance on this accounting information improves the accuracy of IPO 
pricing. Finally, I show that this information is more likely to be fully impounded into 
the final offer price when there is greater participation from institutional investors in the 
bookbuilding process. These findings highlight the value that investors associate with 
an IPO firm’s accounting information and reveal that the price revision is much more 
predictable than suggested by the extant literature. 
 To perform my tests, I rely on the fundamental analysis literature to guide my 
selection of detailed financial statement information that has been shown to provide 
useful information about a firm’s future performance (Ou and Penman, 1989; Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). I then use a simple financial statement 
analysis process to construct a measure (Performance) that sorts the cross-section of IPO 
firms into groups based on their expected future performance (e.g., Piotroski, 2000; 
Wahlen and Wieland, 2011).4 Importantly, the information required to construct this 
                                                        
4 Specifically, Performance is a composite score comprised of the following six fundamental signals: Δ PP&E, Δ 
Leverage, Δ CFO, Δ EBIT, Δ Asset Turnover, and Δ GM. While prior research has found each of these signals to 
be useful in predicting a firm’s future performance, there is no look-ahead bias in my study since I examine the 
price changes that occur during IPO price formation. Refer to Section 3.2.1 for additional information about this 
measure. 
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measure is available to investors prior to the beginning of the bookbuilding period. 
However, for research purposes, Compustat only provides this information for the 
subset of firms that successfully complete an offering. To avoid the selection bias 
concerns associated with excluding the investor feedback for the firms that withdrew an 
offering during the registration period, I manually gather their information directly 
from their registration statements. This provides me with a data set that is able to 
address my question of interest without conditioning my findings to the subset of 
successful offerings. It also provides a rare, detailed examination of the characteristics of 
firms that elect to withdraw their IPOs during the registration process.5 
 I begin my empirical analysis by examining whether Performance helps explain the 
cross-sectional variation in the investor feedback received during the bookbuilding 
process. I identify a positive, nearly monotonic relationship between the values of 
Performance and the investor feedback. This positive association is robust to the 
inclusion of controls for market conditions, firm characteristics, the terms of the 
offering, and both year and underwriter fixed effects. This result is also economically 
meaningful as a one standard deviation increase in Performance is associated with a 4.6 
percent increase in the probability that the firm successfully completes its offering and a 
5.1 percent increase in the price revision for the successfully completed offerings. These 
results are consistent with my main prediction and provide evidence that investors 
                                                        
5 The percentage of firms that begin the IPO process and elect to withdraw their offering has historically been 
between 20-25 percent (Hao, 2011). While the costs associated with manually gathering the information for this 
group of firms has generally resulted in their exclusion from empirical research, Busaba et al. (2001) provide 
evidence that these firms are similar in size and profitability to those firms that successfully complete an 
offering. Further, he finds that these firms also engage underwriters that are equally as reputable as those 
facilitating successful offerings.  
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attach more value-relevance to this publicly available accounting information than is 
reflected in the underwriter’s proposed valuation.  
 To reinforce my finding that an IPO firm’s accounting information is influencing the 
investor feedback received during the bookbuilding process, I examine a cross-sectional 
setting in which the quality of the accounting-based signal is likely to be either higher or 
lower. Specifically, I expect that the investor feedback will be less sensitive to the 
Performance variable for the most R&D-intensive IPO firms. I expect this relationship 
because the high level of uncertainty surrounding the future benefits of R&D 
investment reduces the predictive value of a firm’s accounting information (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Kothari et al., 2002). Thus, investors are likely to look to information 
sources other than an R&D-intensive firm’s accounting information to project its future 
prospects. Consistent with this prediction, I find that Performance is less predictive of the 
investor feedback received for the more R&D-intensive group of firms. This finding 
provides additional support for my main prediction by showing that investor feedback is 
differentially impacted by IPO firms’ accounting information based on its quality. 
 While my prior results suggest that investors use an issuer’s accounting information 
to adjust the underwriter’s proposed price, they do not speak to whether or not 
investors used this information correctly. To this point, an IPO firm’s long-term value 
may be accurately reflected by the proposed price but investors adjust it because they 
are unable to verify the private information included therein. Under this information-
based theory, the IPO firm’s price would be expected to revert back to the proposed 
price as investors learn additional information about the firm’s value after the offering is 
priced. Contrary to this theory, I identify a positive, nearly monotonic relationship 
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between Performance and the abnormal stock returns earned by IPO firms when they 
begin trading on the secondary market. However, I also find that this result is reduced 
when institutional investors are more involved in the bookbuilding process. These 
findings suggest that investors’ increased reliance on this accounting information 
improved the accuracy of IPO pricing and that sophisticated investors are more likely to 
extract the full value relevance of this information during the bookbuilding process.  
 This study makes several contributions. First, I exploit a powerful setting to 
highlight the value that investors associate with an IPO firm’s accounting information. 
While prior studies frequently suggest that an IPO firm’s accounting information is 
either ignored by investors (Shiller, 1990) or that it is of limited use for valuation 
purposes (Ritter, 1998; Kim and Ritter, 1999), my results indicate that accounting plays a 
significant role in investors’ evaluations of IPO firms.  
 Second, I show that the price revision is much more predictable than is suggested 
by prior research. Specifically, I show that a firm’s expected future performance, as 
indicated by its historical accounting information, is positively associated with the price 
revision. This finding combines with Lowry and Schwert (2004) to caution future 
research against using the underwriter’s proposed price as an unbiased predictor of the 
final offer price.  
 Third, I extend the fundamental analysis literature by documenting the signaling 
role of accounting information for growth firms. While prior literature questions 
whether a firm’s fundamental signals are useful for projecting a growth firm’s future 
prospects (Piotroski, 2000), my findings reveal that this information is positively 
associated with the secondary market abnormal returns of IPO firms.  
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 Finally, included in my additional analyses, I provide the first empirical evidence 
that underwriters incur reputational damage for marketing overpriced offerings. 
Specifically, I show that an underwriter’s future market share is increasing in the 
average price revision of the firms that the underwriter has brought to market. This 
finding provides support to prior theory that assumes this relationship (e.g., 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994) and cautions underwriters from engaging in 
competitive bidding during the underwriter selection process. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides information about the IPO 
setting and discusses the motivation for my study. Chapter 3 describes the data used in 
my study. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results. Chapter 5 documents robustness 
tests for my empirical results. Chapter 6 provides additional analyses, and Chapter 7 
concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background and Research Design 
Several prior studies examine whether accounting information is useful for valuing IPO 
firms. A recurring theme in this literature is that trading strategies which are based on 
accounting information at the time of the IPO earn abnormal returns subsequent to the 
initial offering (Peristiani and Hong, 2004; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; 
Demers and Joos, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2012). This persistent 
finding, aided by frequent media commentary,6 has raised questions about whether the 
investors involved in the bookbuilding process are ignoring the accounting information 
of IPO firms when making their investment decisions.  
 One reason that investors may ignore an issuer’s accounting information is because 
underwriters propose a suggested price for the offering at the beginning of the 
bookbuilding process. Rather than incurring their own costs to gather and process an 
IPO firm’s information (Merton, 1987), investors may choose to simply rely on the 
underwriter’s proposed price (Grossman, 1976). Consistent with this possibility, Shiller 
(1990) presents survey evidence that only a small minority of IPO investors performed 
                                                        
6 For example, following Facebook’s IPO, Aswath Damodaran wrote a guest post for Forbes noting that “Much 
as I would like to believe that the pricing of Facebook’s IPO was based upon an assessment of the fundamentals, 
I am a realist. Much of what passes for valuation on Wall Street and corporate boardrooms is not valuation, but 
pricing (Damodaran, 2012).”  Similar articles are easily found for Groupon, Zynga, Twitter, and many other 
IPOs. 
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any calculation of a share’s fundamental value and compared it to the underwriter’s 
proposed price. Rather, these repeat investors reported that their investment decisions 
were primarily determined by the underwriter’s recommendation. 
 The underwriter’s role in the IPO process has impeded researchers’ ability to 
identify how investors use an IPO firm’s accounting information in their investment 
decisions. While some studies find accounting information to be value-relevant for IPO 
firms (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2009), a value-relevance research 
design is unable to disentangle whether investors are using the firm’s accounting 
information or simply relying on the underwriter’s proposed valuation (Shiller, 1990). 
To overcome this limitation, and examine how a firm’s accounting information 
influences investors’ investment decisions, I examine the investor feedback provided to 
underwriters after they have proposed a valuation for the offering. This research design 
allows me to examine how investors use accounting information to evaluate IPO firms 
without the endogeneity concerns introduced by the underwriter’s involvement in the 
IPO process. 
2.2 Setting: The IPO Process 
 The vast majority of IPOs are priced using the bookbuilding mechanism (Wilhelm, 
2005; Jagannathan and Sherman, 2006). To better understand the role of bookbuilding 
and the investor feedback provided during this process, it is useful to consider the 
bilateral information asymmetry that exists when firms go public. Specifically, investors 
generally have very little information about an IPO firm prior to its offering, while the 
IPO firm knows neither the investors who may be interested in the offering nor their 
level of interest (Draho, 2004). To reduce this bilateral information asymmetry, an IPO 
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firm files a registration statement with the SEC providing extensive information about 
the firm (Leone, et al., 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2013). In the event that an IPO 
firm learns new information during the registration period that may reasonably impact 
its valuation, it has a legal responsibility to communicate this new information to 
investors by amending its registration statement. This process, required by the 
Securities Act of 1933, is designed to produce a single document about the IPO firm 
which investors can use to make an informed investment decision. 
 Having provided this information to investors, the underwriter proposes a price for 
the offering and begins to market it through the bookbuilding process. During this 
process, underwriters solicit non-binding indications of interest from potential 
investors. The underwriter then uses this information to understand the actual demand 
for the offering and sets the final offer price accordingly. While the registration 
statement includes a proposed pricing range for the offering, the final offer price 
frequently varies both within and outside of this range. This price change, measured 
from the midpoint of the proposed pricing range to the final offer price, is referred to as 
the price revision. The price revision is extremely important to a firm since it captures 
the difference between the firm’s expected and actual cost of equity capital. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 While the underwriter uses investors’ indications of interest to set the final price 
(Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001, 2003), this price may not reflect investors’ actual level of 
demand. This is because investors will only reveal that their valuation is in excess of the 
proposed price if the underwriter agrees to only partially impound this information into 
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the final offer price (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). By only partially impounding the 
positive information received during the bookbuilding process, the underwriter can 
then use its allocation discretion to reward the investors that revealed the positive 
information with underpriced shares (Aggarwal et al., 2002). On the other hand, if 
investors’ valuations are lower than the underwriter’s proposed price then this negative 
information must be fully impounded into the final price in order to clear the market. 
Thus, the firm’s stock returns from its first day of trading on the secondary market must 
also be considered when attempting to quantify the full extent of the mispricing 
(Hanley, 1993). 
2.3 Motivation 
 Issuing firms provide extensive information in the registration statement to 
potential investors. However, these investors remain at a significant information 
disadvantage relative to the issuing firms. To overcome this information problem, 
issuing firms contract with an underwriter that can use its reputational capital to 
enhance the offering’s credibility (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Booth and Smith, 1986). In this 
role of financial intermediary, underwriters face conflicting pressures to both minimize 
an IPO firm’s cost of capital and to provide investors with attractive investment 
opportunities (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Given these conflicting pressures, the analytical 
models that underlie the IPO literature assume that the prices proposed by underwriters 
will be reflect all of the information known to the underwriter about the value of issuing 
firms (Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). This assumption implies that the price 
revision is exclusively related to new information learned by the underwriter during the 
bookbuilding process 
12 
 
 Based on these analytical models, the limited empirical research that examines the 
price revision has generally focused on how the arrival of new information during the 
bookbuilding period (e.g., changes in macroeconomic conditions) influences the price 
revision. While these studies find that the price revision is sensitive to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions during the bookbuilding period (Lowry and Schwert, 2004; 
Ince, 2008), they are unable to explain the quantitative magnitude of the price revision 
that is observed in the U.S. market. Accordingly, Ritter (2011) concludes that the 
information-based theories that underlie the IPO literature are “at best of second order 
importance” and admonishes future research to more fully consider the quality of the 
underwriter’s proposed price. 
 One reason that the quality of an underwriter’s proposed price may be 
compromised is because an IPO firm has a strong incentive to minimize its cost of 
capital. Given this incentive, an underwriter that is pessimistic about a firm’s future 
prospects is unlikely to be selected to lead that firm’s offering. Aware of this, potential 
underwriters competing to be selected to lead a firm’s offering may attempt to increase 
the probability of being selected by only proposing valuations that reflect issuing firms 
as having abnormally strong future prospects.7 While some IPO firms may indeed have 
future prospects that justify such a valuation, the competitive underwriter selection 
process likely leads many IPO firms to be marketed as having future prospects that 
exceed their actual prospects.8  
                                                        
7 Refer to Appendix B for additional commentary regarding underwriter behavior during the underwriter 
selection process. 
8 Note that this process is likely to result in a winner’s curse (Thaler, 1988). However, underwriters don’t incur 
the financial repercussions associated with this overbidding since they are able to adjust the price after the 
bookbuilding process to reflect the market’s actual level of demand. This is one of the primary reasons that 
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 This potential misvaluation provides investors with a financial incentive to gather 
information about the values of IPO firms (Grossman, 1976; Kothari, 2001). As part of 
this process, I expect investors to use the accounting information of IPO firms to obtain 
a more objective indicator about these firms’ future prospects, which they can then use 
to revise the proposed prices. While prior research questions whether a growth firm’s 
accounting information is capable of providing a reliable signal about that firm’s future 
prospects (Ritter, 1998; Piotroski, 2000), an IPO firm’s accounting information is 
generally viewed as the most accurate and detailed information available to investors 
about the IPO firm’s operations. Accordingly, I expect issuing firms whose accounting 
information corroborates the strong future prospects reflected in their proposed 
valuations to be more likely to maintain that valuation relative to those firms that do not 
have the supporting accounting information and make the following prediction: 
Prediction 1: The investor feedback received during the bookbuilding 
period is increasing in an IPO firm’s expected future performance, as 
indicated by its fundamental signals. 
Prediction 1 is based on the premise that the majority of IPO firms are marketed as 
having strong future prospects to investors and that investors use these firms’ 
accounting information to determine whether these claims are accurate.9 However, if the 
predictive value of these firms’ accounting information is driving investors’ use of it 
then the association between this accounting information and the investor feedback 
                                                                                                                                                                            
underwriters prefer using the bookbuilding method to price IPOs rather than fixed-price methods (Biais and 
Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002).  
9 Consistent with this idea that investors look to an IPO firm’s historical information to determine its future 
prospects, Brau and Fawcett (2006) provide survey evidence that IPO investors consider “having strong 
historical earnings” as the strongest signal regarding an IPO firm’s value.  
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received by IPO firms should vary based on the information’s predictive value. 
Accordingly, I examine a cross-sectional setting in which the quality of this signal is 
likely to be either higher or lower. Specifically, I examine whether the relationship 
between issuers’ expected future performance, as communicated by their accounting 
information, and the investor feedback received during the bookbuilding period is 
lower for R&D-intensive firms. I expect this relationship because the predictive value of 
a firm’s accounting information is reduced by the high level of uncertainty about the 
future benefits associated with R&D investment (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Kothari et 
al., 2002). Thus, I make the following prediction: 
Prediction 2: An IPO firm’s expected future performance, as 
indicated by its fundamental signals, is less predictive of the investor 
feedback received during the bookbuilding process for R&D-intensive 
firms. 
The underlying premise of this paper is that investors will use an accounting-based 
signal to reduce the mispricing that arises from the competitive underwriter selection 
process. While my prior predictions seek to establish that investors are using an IPO 
firm’s accounting information to revise the proposed price, they do not speak to 
whether or not investors use this information correctly. To this point, the prices 
proposed for IPO firms may actually reflect their long-term values but investors adjust 
them because they are unable to verify the private information included therein. In this 
case, investors’ use of these firms’ accounting information to convey their future 
prospects may actually reduce the accuracy of IPO pricing (Teoh et al., 1998; Kim and 
Ritter, 1999). Thus, it is imperative to examine the subsequent performance of IPO firms 
15 
 
to determine whether or not investors used this information to improve the accuracy of 
IPO pricing. Based on my hypothesis that investors used this information to revise the 
proposed prices closer to firms’ long-term values, I make the following prediction:  
Prediction 3: Investors’ increased weighting of a firm’s expected 
future performance, as indicated by its fundamental signals, 
increases the accuracy of IPO pricing. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
I obtain a listing of all U.S. industrials that filed their initial registration statement with 
the SEC from 2001–2007 from the Global New Issues Database within Thomson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum.10 Consistent with prior research on IPO firms, I exclude from 
my sample: unit offers, ADRs, carve-outs/spin-offs, reverse LBOs, partnerships, 
financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), and filings of less than $10 million. My research 
design further requires that IPO firms have comparable audited financial statements for 
the two years prior to their filing; firms without this information are also excluded from 
my study. Table 1 details this sample selection process resulting in 698 IPO filings that 
meet the criteria for inclusion in my study. Of these, 510 filings were successfully 
completed and the remaining 188 were withdrawn prior to completion. 
 The historical financial information for IPO firms is generally available through 
Compustat for the subset of firms that successfully complete an offering. However, it is 
not readily available for the subset of firms that elected to withdraw their filing during 
the registration process. To avoid the selection bias concerns associated with excluding 
                                                        
10 I select this particular time period for my sample so that two highly unusual periods of IPO activity don’t 
influence my results. First, I begin my period in 2001 to exclude IPOs completed during the internet bubble when 
IPOs exhibited anomalous pricing behavior (Ljungvist and Wilhelm, 2003). Second, I conclude my sample at the 
end of 2007 to avoid the financial crisis that also resulted in a period of unusual IPO pricing and activity. 
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this group of firms from my sample, I manually gather their information from their 
registration statements filed with the SEC.11  
INSERT TABLE 1 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
I now discuss the construction of each variable used in my study and provide 
descriptive statistics for these variables in Table 2. I also include more detailed 
descriptions of each variable as part of Appendix A. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
3.2.1 Measuring Expected Firm Performance 
The fundamental analysis literature examines the predictive value of detailed financial 
statement information.12 I rely on this prior research, and surveys of institutional 
investors, to guide my selection of historical financial information that investors may 
recognize as useful signals of an IPO firm’s future performance. Specifically, I choose a 
total of six fundamental signals from three distinct areas of the firm: profitability, capital 
structure, and operating efficiency. I then use a simple financial statement analysis 
process to create a measure that sorts the cross-section of IPO firms into groups based 
on their expected future performance. This measure (Performance) is constructed by 
assigning point values based on the directional changes observed for each fundamental 
                                                        
11 Note that the inclusion of these firms significantly increases the data gathering costs for this study. While I 
could incorporate additional years in the study by manually gathering the information for the firms that 
withdrew their offerings in those years, the anomalous nature of the neighboring time periods (as described in 
footnote 10) present external validity concerns if I include these periods in my sample. Thus, I do not collect the 
additional data as I suspect that the costs associated with gathering this information will exceed the benefit 
gained from doing so. 
12 See Kothari (2001) and Richardson et al., (2010) for excellent overviews of the fundamental analysis literature. 
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signal included in the scoring model, with higher values predicting better future 
performance. 
 The first two fundamental signals included in my scoring model relate to changes in 
a firm’s profitability. Specifically, I include Δ Earnings before Interest and Taxes (Δ 
EBIT) and Δ Cash Flow from Operations (Δ CFO). I choose EBIT rather than net income 
because there are often significant changes made to a firm’s capital structure in 
conjunction with its IPO.13 Thus, EBIT is often viewed as a more useful measure of an 
IPO firm’s future profitability than is net income. While an increase in a growth firm’s 
profitability is considered a positive signal of its future performance, so is an increase in 
its cash flow from operations. An increase in either of these two measures for an IPO 
firm sends a strong signal to investors that the firm has completed the start-up phase of 
its life cycle and has entered into its growth phase. Accordingly, I include both of these 
measures in my scoring model and assign IPO firms that show year-over-year increases 
in CFO or EBIT during the pre-IPO period a point value of one for each increase, zero 
otherwise. 
 The next two fundamental signals included in my scoring model examine recent 
changes in the capital structure of IPO firms. These two signals are Δ Leverage (Δ Lev) 
and Δ Property, Plant, and Equipment (Δ PP&E). A firm that decreases its leverage 
signals to investors that it is able to internally generate sufficient funds to operate its 
business (Myers and Majluf 1984). This provides new investors with some assurance 
that their equity position will not be significantly diluted in the near future. 
                                                        
13 For example, Baker and Wurgler (2002) report that the average IPO firm’s leverage ratio (measured as long-
term debt to assets) decreased from 66.5 percent to 43.2 percent after going public. 
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Additionally, equity investors generally prefer that IPO firms use the proceeds from the 
offering to invest in the firm’s growth rather than to satisfy debt obligations. Hence, 
firms that have reduced their debt in the pre-offering period generally appear more 
attractive to equity investors. 14 Capital expansion also sends a strong positive signal to 
investors that the firm’s current growth opportunities exceed its prior production 
capacity (Cooper et al., 2008). Accordingly, I assign a point value of one for firms that 
have a year-over-year decrease (increase) in leverage (PP&E) during the pre-IPO period, 
zero otherwise. 
 The final two fundamental signals that I include in my scoring model examine the 
changes in an IPO firm’s operating efficiencies. Specifically, I include Δ Asset Turnover 
(Δ AT) and Δ Gross Margin (Δ GM) in the scoring model. These two staples of the 
fundamental analysis literature are used to evaluate how well a firm is positioned to 
grow its business. An increase in asset turnover suggests that a firm is improving the 
manner in which it employs its capital. On the other hand, changes in gross margin 
measure the firm’s changing position in its input markets relative to its output markets. 
IPO firms that have improved their asset turnover or gross margin signal their ability to 
increase their profitability with their current business model. Accordingly, I assign a 
point value of one for firms that show year-over-year increases in their asset turnover or 
gross margin during the pre-IPO period, zero otherwise. 
                                                        
14 An argument could be made that an increase in a firm’s leverage is a more positive signal of its future 
prospects than is a decrease in leverage. However, consistent with a decrease in leverage being viewed as a 
positive signal for IPO firms, Ernst & Young (2009) finds that 70 percent of surveyed institutional investors 
indicated that “reduced debt levels prior to the IPO event” was the type of corporate activity that created the 
most value for pre-listed firms. 
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 As previously discussed, Performance is a composite score variable that sums the 
values of six binary signals. This simple approach produces a variable that can range 
from a low score of zero to a high score of six, with higher values predicting stronger 
future performance. As noted in prior research, there are two primary concerns that 
arise when employing scoring models to answer research questions. The first concern 
questions the selection method used to identify the individual components included in 
the composite score. In my case, each of the six fundamental signals selected has been 
used for decades in prior research and has been shown to be a useful signal of a firm’s 
future performance. Prior research has identified far more than six signals (Ou and 
Penman, 1989). However, I selected these six signals to include in my scoring model 
based on their relevance to growth firms, which are the focus of my study.15  
 The second concern that arises from the use of my scoring model is the translation 
of continuous signals into binary signals. I select this simplified methodology for several 
reasons. First, prior studies have found that these signals retain much of their predictive 
ability when a simplified classification scheme is used (Piotroski, 2000; Wahlen and 
Wieland, 2011). Second, it allows multiple signals to be combined together in a simple 
and transparent manner when the combination of multiple signals is viewed as a better 
proxy than any individual signal. While an alternative approach would be to combine 
multiple signals by assigning a rank value to each firm’s continuous signal relative to 
the cross-section of other firms, this ranking approach requires the user to identify all of 
the other firms in the cross-section to perform the analysis. On the other hand, my 
                                                        
15 In selecting these six signals, I do not have any expectation that I have selected the optimal set of signals and 
make no attempts in the paper to identify the optimal set of signals for this purpose. However, Section 5.1 
includes extensive robustness tests using various combinations of the six signals included in my composite score.  
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simplified approach requires the user to have only the IPO firm’s two most recent years 
of accounting information, which is included in the firm’s registration statement.16 
3.2.2 Measuring Investor Feedback 
I use five variables to measure the investor feedback received during the bookbuilding 
process. Each of these variables has been used in prior research and is computed so that 
higher values represent greater investor feedback received. These variables are 
computed as follows:  
 IPO Completion: I construct an indicator variable (Public) that takes the value of one 
if the IPO is successful, zero otherwise. 
 Price Range: I create an ordinal variable (Range) that captures where an IPO firm’s 
final price is relative to the proposed pricing range. Specifically, Range has a value of 
zero for firms that withdraw their offering, one for firms that price below the proposed 
range, two for firms that price within the proposed range, and three for firms that price 
above the proposed range. 
 Price Revision: The price revision captures the percentage change between an IPO 
firm’s final offer price and the midpoint of the initially proposed pricing range 
(Revision). Because this outcome is only observed for the subset of IPO firms that 
complete an offering, all inferences made when using Revision as a dependent variable 
are conditional on completing the offering.  
 Initial Return: An IPO firm’s initial return captures the percentage change in a 
firm’s stock price on its first day of trading on the secondary market (Init_Return). As 
                                                        
16 In Section 5.1, I perform extensive robustness tests using alternative methodologies that allow for increased 
variation in the individual signal realizations. I find that my results are robust to several alternative 
methodologies. 
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noted in Section 2.2, the initial return may include a portion of the mispricing from the 
proposed offer price. Thus, I create an additional variable (Tot_Revision) that combines 
the price revision and the initial return into a single variable to capture the full extent of 
the mispricing for successfully completed offerings. 
3.2.3 Measuring Firm Value 
The Performance measure is designed to sort the cross-section of firms into groups based 
on their expected future performance. Thus, regardless of whether it has predictive 
value about the investor feedback received during the bookbuilding period, this 
measure should be value-relevant. While value-relevance studies generally use a firm’s 
price per share as the dependent variable, the IPO literature has generally used 
alternative measures to examine questions of value-relevance since underwriters prefer 
to price each offering around $15 (Fernando et al., 2004). This clustering around a single 
price forces the explanatory power to come through the correlation between the variable 
of interest and the number of shares outstanding. As a result, value-relevance studies of 
IPO firms that use a traditional price per share measure generally have very little 
explanatory power and highly unstable results (Beatty et al., 2000). 
 To combat this problem, value-relevance studies of IPO firms generally use the total 
market value of equity or a log transformation of that amount as the dependent 
variable. Comparing models that use these two measures, those that use the log 
transformation generally provide the best fit (Beatty et al., 2000; Hand, 2003). Further, its 
distribution more closely resembles that of a normal distribution, providing it with 
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attractive econometric properties.17 Thus, I follow prior research and use the log 
transformation of each firm’s total market value of equity as the dependent variable for 
my tests of value-relevance. I calculate this measure at each of the three stages of the 
IPO process by taking the natural log of the product of the IPO firm’s post-IPO shares 
and the midpoint of the proposed pricing range (Initial), the offer price (Offer), and the 
closing price on the firm’s first day of trading on the secondary market (Secondary). 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
I include several control variables that prior research has shown to impact either IPO 
price formation or valuation. These variables primarily relate to IPO firm-specific 
accounting information but also include variables relating to deal characteristics and 
market conditions during the IPO process. 
 Firm-Specific: The firm-specific accounting information included as control 
variables in my study include the IPO firm’s: book value of equity (Book_Value), cash 
flow from operations (CFO), total revenues (Revenues), R&D expenditures (R&D), 
leverage (Leverage), and both the signed and absolute value of earnings before income 
tax (EBIT, Abs_EBIT). I also include the percentage of the firm’s post-IPO shares held by 
the firm’s executives and directors (Insider). For consistency with the transformations 
made to firm value (and to enhance comparison with prior research), I also make log 
transformations to all of the IPO firm-specific variables with the exception of Leverage, 
which is a ratio. When the original value is positive for these variables, I make the 
transformation as log (1+value) but make the transformation as –log (1-value) when the 
                                                        
17 In my sample, the distribution of firm value at the final offer price displays considerable non-normality as the 
skewness is 7.74 and the kurtosis is 87.24. However, the distribution of the natural log of firm value has a much 
closer resemblance to the normal distribution as the skewness is -0.01 and the kurtosis is 3.74. 
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value is negative. This transformation is able to retain the negative values included in 
the original data while also maintaining the monotonic relationship among the actual 
realized values.  
 Deal Characteristics: I also include several deal characteristics as control variables in 
my study that may impact either the IPO valuation or the price revision. Foremost, I 
control for the underwriter’s reputation (Underwriter) using the average Carter-
Manaster ranking of the lead underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990). I also include a 
variable indicating that a Big Five auditor signed off on the IPO firm’s financial 
statements (Auditor), the natural log of one plus the number of risk factors disclosed in 
the initial registration statement (Risk_Factors), and the natural log of one plus the filing 
amount (Filing_Amount). 
 Market Conditions: Prior research finds that changes in macroeconomic conditions 
are a significant determinant of the price revision (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry 
and Schwert, 2004). Accordingly, I include two control variables that capture these 
changes in my study. First, I use the CRSP value-weighted index during each firm’s 
registration period (Mkt_Ret). Second, I use the percentage of the successfully completed 
IPOs to the total number of completed IPOs (successfully completed + withdrawn) 
during each firm’s registration period (Mkt_Comp). 
 Fixed Effects: I include both year and underwriter fixed effects in my analysis. Year 
fixed effects are included in my research design to remove any time-specific variation in 
the IPO price formation process. On the other hand, underwriter fixed effects are 
included to remove the idiosyncratic effect that each underwriter may have on the price 
formation process. For example, Liu and Ritter (2011) provide limited evidence that 
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underwriters receive compensation in the form of higher initial returns for packaging 
non-price dimensions (e.g., analyst coverage, price support) with their underwriting 
services. Thus, the underwriter fixed effects will remove the portion of the price changes 
that are associated with any non-price dimensions that are consistently offered by any 
individual underwriter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Empirical Results 
4.1 Determinants of Investor Feedback 
I begin my empirical analysis by examining the relationship between a firm’s expected 
future performance and the investor feedback that it receives during the bookbuilding 
period. To do so, I estimate the following equation:  
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽9𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽13𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐼𝑃𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  
where Feedback_Variablei is either Publici, Rangei, Revisioni, Init_Returni, or Tot_Revisioni. 
Each of these dependent variables is defined in Section 3.2.2 of this paper and captures 
the investor feedback that is received during the IPO process. As motivated in Section 
2.3, β1 is the primary coefficient of interest for this model and is predicted to have a 
positive coefficient. All other variables included in the model are as defined in Section 
3.2.4.18 
INSERT TABLE 4 
                                                        
18 Note that the investor feedback captures differences between the underwriter’s proposed valuation and the 
final offer price. Given the absence of theory about which variables will be valued by underwriters and 
investors, and the lack of prior empirical research on this topic, the empirical model is admittedly ad-hoc. 
However, I include prior variables shown to influence investor feedback in prior literature (e.g., market 
conditions) as well as other variables that have been shown to influence firm value. By including these 
additional variables, I reduce the concern that my result is driven by omitted correlated variables. 
(1) 
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 Table 4, Panel A provides the results from estimating Equation 1. Consistent with 
the main prediction of this paper, I find that β1 is positive and statistically significant in 
each of the models. This relationship is also economically meaningful as a one standard 
deviation increase in Performance is associated with a 4.6 percent increase in the 
probability that the IPO firm completes its offering (Model 1), a 5.1 percent increase in 
the price revision (Model 3), and a 3.8 percent increase in its initial return (Model 4).19 
The strength of this finding is also evidenced by the fact that the only other variable that 
is statistically significant in each model is Mkt_Ret, which captures the change in 
macroeconomic conditions during the registration period. This result highlights the 
value that investors associate with accounting information when evaluating IPO firms. 
It also combines with Lowry & Schwert (2004) to caution future research against using 
the underwriter’s proposed price as an unbiased predictor of the final offer price. 
 Figure 2 charts the average price revision (Revision) and the average total revision 
(Tot_Revision) for each value of Performance. Consistent with the multivariate results 
documented in Panel A of Table 4, Figure 2 reveals a positive, nearly monotonic 
relationship between the values of Performance and the investor feedback received 
during the IPO process for the successfully completed offerings. Additionally, two well-
established empirical patterns are evident from the graphical representation. First, 
                                                        
19 As part of my additional analyses, I examine how this information about firms’ future prospects differentially 
impacts firms’ initial returns conditional on the sign of the price revision. As noted in Section 2.2, the partial 
adjustment hypothesis suggests that the information revealed by investors during the bookbuilding process will 
be fully (partially) impounded into the final offer price for proposed valuations that are above (below) investors 
valuations of the firm. Thus, if investors are using this information to adjust the proposed price then the 
Performance variable should only continue to have explanatory power over firms’ initial returns when the 
information has not been fully impounded into the final offer price (e.g., when the price revision is not negative). 
Consistent with this logic, I find that the coefficient on the Performance variable is estimated to be insignificant 
(significantly positive) for offerings with negative (non-negative) price revisions. See Section 6.2 for additional 
information. 
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initial returns are significantly positive (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984). Second, 
the initial returns are increasing in the price revision. This observation highlights the 
asymmetric price response to good and bad information revealed about IPO firms 
during the bookbuilding portion of the IPO process (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; 
Hanley, 1993).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 
4.2 Value-Relevance 
My prior results show that Performance is useful in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in the investor feedback received during IPO price formation. However, the 
underlying motivation to create the Performance variable is to separate the more valuable 
firms from those that are less valuable. While my primary hypothesis is based on the 
premise that the proposed price does not accurately reflect the appropriate variation in 
the future prospects of IPO firms, this variation should be apparent at the conclusion of 
the bookbuilding process. Thus, I estimate the following OLS regression to examine the 
value-relevance of Performance at each stage of the IPO process: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽9𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
where Firm_Value_Variablei is either the natural log of one plus the IPO firm’s total 
equity value based on the midpoint of the initial pricing range (Initial), the final offer 
price (Offer), or the firm’s closing price on its first day of trading on the secondary 
market (Secondary). The primary variable of interest in this equation is the Performance 
(2) 
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variable that is predicted to have a positive coefficient. All other variables included in 
the model are as defined in Section 3.2.4. 
 Panel B of Table 4 includes the results from estimating Equation 2. I find that the 
magnitude of β1 is increasing at each progressive stage of the IPO process. Specifically, I 
find that β1 is estimated as 0.0122 for the proposed price (Model 1), increases to 0.0366 
for the offer price (Model 2), and ultimately to 0.580 when the firm is trading on the 
secondary market (Model 3).20 This progression illustrates how the value-relevance of 
accounting information is altered by investors’ use of that information during the 
bookbuilding process. While Bartov et al., (2002) highlighted that there were differences 
in the value-relevance of accounting variables across the different stages of the IPO 
pricing process, they made no attempt to explain why these differences existed. My 
results suggest that some of these differences stem from investors removing the 
incentives behind the underwriters’ proposed prices. 
4.3 Variation in Predictive Value 
To reinforce that my initial finding was driven by investors’ use of the accounting 
information of IPO firms, I examine a cross-sectional setting in which the predictive 
value of firms’ accounting information is likely to be either higher or lower. Specifically, 
I classify the quartile of firms in my sample with the highest R&D intensity as 
producing a lower-quality signal relative to the other firms in my sample. I then 
partition the sample based on this designation (R&D_Inten) and re-estimate Equation 1 
                                                        
20 The actual number of observations in my sample with a value for Initial is 580 as opposed to the 510 that are 
reported in Panel B of Table 4. As only 510 of the firms completed their offerings, 70 firms had disclosed their 
proposed valuation prior to withdrawing their offerings. When estimating Equation 2 for the full 580 
observations in my sample, I find that the estimated coefficient is 0.0329 (t-statistic = 1.17) resulting in the same 
inferences when restricting the sample to the completed offerings. Thus, I elect to tabulate only the completed 
offerings in order to enhance the comparability of the estimates across the different stages of the IPO process. 
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for each partition of firms. Based on my expectation that investors will reduce their use 
of the firm’s accounting information when it is of lower quality, I predict that β1 will be 
lower for the more R&D-intensive group of firms.21  
INSERT TABLE 5 
 Consistent with my prediction, Panel A of Table 5 reveals that the estimate for β1 is 
lower for the more R&D-intensive group of firms in each of the five models, four of 
which indicate that the difference is statistically significant. This result is consistent with 
investors reducing their use of this accounting information when it is of lower quality. 
To reinforce this interpretation, I also re-estimate Equation 2 for each partition of firms. 
In untabulated results, I again find that the estimated coefficient for the Performance 
variable is always lower for the more R&D-intensive firms. Further, while the difference 
in the coefficient’s magnitude is not statistically significant at the initial valuation (t-stat 
= -1.09), the difference is statistically significant at the conclusion of the price formation 
process (t-stat = -2.13). Taken together, the findings from Table 5 are consistent with my 
main prediction and provide evidence that the results documented in Table 4 are in fact 
being driven by investors’ use of the issuing firm’s accounting information. 
4.4 IPO Pricing Accuracy 
The underlying premise of my study is that investors can improve the accuracy of IPO 
pricing by increasing the weighting of firms’ expected future performance, as indicated 
                                                        
21 Separating my sample of firms on their R&D-intensity does not create a group of growth firms and a separate 
group of value firms. In fact, the underlying distributions reveal that the majority of firms in each group is in the 
lowest quintile of book-to-market ratios trading on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Further, the mean and 
median book-to-market ratio for each group is in the lowest quintile of book-to-market ratios. This is a 
significant contrast to Piotroski (2000) who restricted his sample to those firms in the top quintile of the book-to-
market ratio distribution. 
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by their accounting information. While my prior results show that investors are using 
this information to adjust the proposed price, they do not indicate whether investors 
used this information correctly. Accordingly, I now examine whether investors’ 
increased weighting of this information improves the accuracy of IPO pricing. 
 To address this question, I examine the relationship between the Performance 
variable and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns earned by firms when they begin 
trading on the secondary market. If investors incorrectly applied the increased 
weighting to this accounting information when pricing these IPO firms then we would 
expect to see a negative relationship between the Performance variable and these firms’ 
abnormal returns when they begin trading on the secondary market. On the other hand, 
if this information was used to increase the accuracy of IPO pricing then we should not 
observe this negative relationship. Accordingly, I form portfolios on the individual 
values of the Performance variable and examine the average buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for each portfolio.  
 I measure each firm’s BHAR by adjusting its gross returns for the first 180 days by 
its size and risk. Specifically, I subtract the returns earned by each firm’s Fama-French 
10x10 portfolio over the same period 180 day period. I choose 180 days because two 
prominent features that impact the secondary market pricing of IPOs are expired after 
180 days of trading, namely insiders’ lockup provisions (Field and Hanka, 2001) and 
underwriters’ overallotment options (Lewellen, 2006). By allowing sufficient time for 
these features to expire, I remove concerns that the observed price is not a true market 
price.  Using the Fama and French 10x10 portfolios as a benchmark, I follow Barber and 
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Lyon (1997) in applying the following calculation for issuing firm i over horizon n to 
derive each firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal return: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖.𝑛 = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑛)
𝑛=181
𝑛=2 ] − [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑛)
𝑛=181
𝑛=2 ] 
where Ri,n is the gross stock return in period n for issuing firm i and Rm,n is the 
benchmarked return in period n for benchmark m.  
 Contrary to the negative relationship that would exist if investors had used the 
information incorrectly, Figure 3 reveals a positive, nearly monotonic relationship 
between the values of Performance and BHAR. This finding suggests that investors’ use 
of this accounting information improved the accuracy of IPO pricing. In fact, the 
positive relationship between Performance and BHAR suggests that the accuracy of IPO 
pricing could be further improved if investors had placed an even greater reliance on 
this information when pricing IPOs. Table 6, Panel A provides additional detail about 
this relationship revealing that the entire distribution of abnormal returns earned by 
IPO firms on the secondary market has shifted to the right for firms with higher values 
of Performance. This result closely resembles the one identified by Piotroski (2000) in his 
study examining the ability of a firm’s fundamental signals to predict the abnormal 
returns of publicly traded value firms. To better understand the economic impact of my 
result, I design a pseudo-trading strategy that buys (sells) IPO firms with high (low) 
values of Performance and find that it produces annualized abnormal returns in excess of 
11 percent.22 
                                                        
22 I refer to the trading strategy as a pseudo-trading strategy since the IPOs occur at various times. Thus, it is not 
feasible to use the proceeds from shorting the low Performance firms to purchase the high Performance firms as is 
typically assumed in trading strategies. 
(3) 
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 Having shown that Performance is positively associated with BHAR, I now examine 
whether Performance provides incremental explanatory power about the BHAR of IPO 
firms. To do so, I estimate the following OLS equation:23 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
 Consistent with the distribution documented in Panel A of Table 6, Panel B reveals 
that β1 is positive and statistically significant for the univariate regression (Model 1). 
Model 2 reveals that this positive association is robust to the inclusion of the other 
variables that have been documented to impact the abnormal returns earned by IPO 
firms. Consistent with prior research, I also find that firms’ book-to-market ratio (BM), 
profitability (EBIT), the concurrent market conditions (CRSP), and underwriter prestige 
(Underwriter) are also all positively associated with firms’ BHAR. Overall, Table 6 
provides evidence that investors used these firms’ expected future performance, as 
depicted by their accounting information, to improve the accuracy of IPO pricing.24 
They also provide additional evidence that IPO pricing accuracy could be further 
improved if investors placed greater reliance on the accounting information of IPO 
                                                        
23 In addition to the standard controls used in tests of abnormal returns (BM, Size, Market Return), I also include 
variables that prior research has shown to predict abnormal returns of IPO firms. Specifically, I include EBIT to 
measure the firm’s profitability (Peristiani and Hong, 2004; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004), Underwriter 
to capture the prestige of the underwriter (Carter et al., 1998), Filing_Amount to capture the size of the offering 
(Carter et al, 1998) and the total revision (Tot_Revision) to capture the momentum at the time of the offering. 
24 One could employ several different techniques to examine whether the increased weighting of the Performance 
variable improved the accuracy of IPO pricing. One alternative to the method outlined above is to compare the 
price after 181 trading days to both the proposed price and a price determined by fitting an OLS regression using 
only the proposed price and the Performance variable. Using this alternative approach, I find that the fitted value 
has lower absolute pricing differences for 61.9% of the 510 completed offerings. Thus, this alternative approach 
yields the same inference as that drawn from examining the relationship between Performance and BHAR. 
(4) 
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firms (Peristiani and Hong, 2004; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Demers and 
Joos, 2007; Bhattacharya et al, 2010; Gao et al., 2012). 
INSERT TABLE 6 
4.5 Variation in Investor Sophistication 
My finding that Performance continues to have predictive value on the secondary market 
(Table 6) raises questions about why investors would use this information to revise the 
proposed price but not impound its full value-relevance into the final price. One reason 
that investors may not completely extract this information is because they have limited 
information-processing abilities (Merton, 1987). To examine how investors’ information 
processing abilities influence the secondary market predictive value of the Performance 
variable, I examine a cross-sectional setting where the investors participating in the 
bookbuilding process have information-processing abilities that are either higher or 
lower. Specifically, I partition my sample of firms based on whether a top-tier 
underwriter facilitated the offering. This partition allows me to examine this question 
since IPOs facilitated by lower-quality underwriters place a greater portion of the initial 
allocation with retail investors (Field and Lowry, 2009).25 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 Consistent with investors’ information-processing abilities influencing the extent to 
which a firm’s accounting information is reflected in its final offer price, Table 7 reveals 
that the results documented in Table 6 are primarily driven by the offerings conducted 
                                                        
25 Ideally, I would like to use the percentage of the issuer’s shares allocated to institutional investors to make my 
partition. However, this data is not publicly available and an attempt to use the holdings at the end of the first 
quarter will not be accurate due to the high trading volume that occurs during the immediate post-offering 
period. 
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by lower-tier underwriters.  Specifically, Panel A of Table 7 reveals that the trading 
strategy employed among offerings conducted by lower-tier underwriters generates 
more than three-times the amount of abnormal returns than the same strategy employed 
among offerings conducted by top-tier underwriters (22.3 percent annualized BHAR vs. 
6.7 percent annualized BHAR). Further, the BHAR from the trading strategy are only 
statistically significant for the offerings conducted by lower-tier underwriters (t-stat 
2.381 vs. t-stat 1.226).   
 Panel B of Table 7 provides the results from estimating Equation 4 partitioned by 
underwriter quality. Consistent with the results documented in Panel A, Columns 1-2 of 
Panel B show that the statistically significant positive association between Performance 
and BHAR is concentrated in the offerings conducted by lower-tier underwriters. 
Columns 3-4 of Panel B also show that this result is robust to the inclusion of other 
determinants known to influence the secondary market performance of IPO firms. 
Taken together, Table 7 provides information about why Performance continues to have 
explanatory power even after the bookbuilding process is concluded. It also provides 
further evidence that investors’ information processing abilities have a significant 
impact on the extent to which market prices reflect the full value-relevance of publicly 
available information (Bartov et al., 2000; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Robustness Tests 
5.1 Alternative Measures of Performance 
My results suggest that investors use an accounting-based signal about the future 
prospects of IPO firms to revise the prices proposed for offerings closer to these firms’ 
long-term values. As noted in Section 3.2.2, some concerns arise from my use of a binary 
scoring model to perform my tests. In this section, I address these concerns by 
examining the robustness of my main results to several alternative measures of 
Performance. 
 As noted previously, I select six fundamental signals to include in my scoring 
model. While I explain the reasoning for choosing multiple signals in Section 3.2.2, one 
potential concern with my measure is that a single fundamental signal is driving my 
results, making it unnecessary to construct the Performance measure. To rule out this 
concern, I construct six alternative measures (Performance1-6) that drop one of the six 
fundamental signals included in the original scoring model and re-estimate Equations 1, 
2, and 4.26 Similar to the original Performance variable, Table 8 reveals that the 
coefficients for these alternative measures of Performance are estimated to be positive 
and statistically significant for each of the dependent variables examined in my study 
                                                        
26 Specifically, the alternative measures are computed as follows: Performance1 = Performance – Δ AT, Performance2 
= Performance – Δ Lev, Performance3 = Performance – Δ PP&E, Performance4 = Performance – Δ CFO, Performance5 = 
Performance – Δ GM and Performance6 = Performance – Δ EBIT.  
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with the exception of Initial. This provides evidence that my results are not driven by 
any single fundamental signal included in my scoring model. Additionally, I re-estimate 
each of the regressions using each individual fundamental signal separately and find 
that no individual signal is estimated to be statistically significant as frequently as any 
of the composite scores.27 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 A second potential concern with my measure arises from my use of binary signals. 
While I explain the reasoning for this scoring approach in Section 3.2.2, alternative 
combinations of the six signals that allow for increased variation should yield similar 
results. Accordingly, I perform additional robustness tests by constructing two 
alternative measures (Performance7-8) that allow for increased variation in the individual 
signals.28 Table 8 reveals that the coefficient for each of these alternative measures is 
estimated to be positive and statistically significant for all nine of the different models 
examined in my study. Also, I find that the t-statistics are noticeably higher for the 
value-relevance regressions when using these alternative measures that utilize the 
variation in each of the fundamental signals. Consistent with prior studies (Piotroski, 
2000), these results suggest that there is slight loss of efficiency from using the 
simplified methodology. 
                                                        
27 For brevity, I do not tabulate the regressions using the individual fundamental signals. However, the 
correlations between each of the individual components and the various dependent variables are provided for 
readers in Panel B of Table 3. As expected, the correlations between each individual signal and the dependent 
variables are all positive. 
28 Specifically, Performance7 assigns values to each firm based on the continuous realization of its fundamental 
signals in comparison to the prior year’s decile cutoffs. It then sums these decile rankings to form the aggregate 
performance measure. Performance8 ranks the continuous realization for each fundamental signal for the entire 
cross section of firms (e.g., ranks 1-698) and sums the ranks together to form the aggregate measure. 
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5.2 The 2005 Securities Offering Reform 
 One reason that I expect investors place a significant weight on the accounting 
information to assess the future prospects of IPO firms is because of the scarcity of other 
information available about these firms during the registration process. The Securities 
Offering Reform was placed into effect on December 1, 2005 which modified the 
registration, communications, and offering processes under the Securities Act of 1933.  
The SEC notes that “Among many other provisions, the rules update and liberalize permitted 
offering activity and communications to allow more information to reach investors by revising 
the "gun-jumping" provisions under the Securities Act.”  Because this offering reform 
potentially provides IPO investors more timely information about the issuer during the 
registration process, its enactment may alter the extent to which investors rely on firms’ 
historical financial information as a signal of their future prospects.   
 To examine how the enactment of the 2005 Securities Reform influenced my 
findings, I modify Equations 1, 2, and 4 and examine whether my results are driven by 
pre-reform offerings.  Specifically, I include an indicator variable identifying whether or 
not the offering began following the enactment of the 2005 reform and the interaction of 
this indicator variable with the Performance variable. Similar to the results reported 
throughout Chapter 4, I find that the Performance variable is estimated to be positive and 
is statistically significant for all of the estimations with the exception of when Initial is 
used as the dependent variable in Equation 2. Also, I find that the interaction term is not 
statistically significant for any of the regressions suggesting that investors’ use of an IPO 
firm’s historical accounting information as a signal of its expected firm performance has 
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not significantly changed in the new regulatory environment. These results also provide 
evidence that the results in Chapter 4 are robust across time.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Additional Analyses 
6.1 Reputational Effects of Marketing Overpriced Securities 
Theory suggests that underwriters incur reputational damage from marketing 
overpriced securities (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
However, this theory is difficult to understand if the price revision is entirely driven by 
factors outside of the underwriter’s control (e.g., changes in macroeconomic conditions), 
as has been the focus of prior empirical studies. In contrast, my findings suggest that 
underwriters systematically exclude value-relevant information from their proposed 
prices. Thus, my findings link this reputational penalty to an underwriter’s action rather 
than a random event.  
 Given this link, I estimate the following OLS regression to examine whether 
underwriters incur reputational damage for marketing overpriced securities:29 
𝛥_𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where Δ_Mkt_Share_Vari,t+1 captures the future change in an underwriter’s market share. 
This variable is measured as the percentage change in either the number of offerings 
facilitated by underwriter i in year t+1 (Δ_Mkt_Share_Counti,t+1) or the percentage 
                                                        
29 Unlike my prior analyses, this analysis requires no financial history about issuing firms. Thus, I expand my 
sample for this analysis to include those firms that were not included in my prior analysis. I also extend my time 
period to 2011 to increase the power of my tests. This increases my sample size to a total of 1,050 IPOs. 
(5) 
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change in the dollar amount of the offerings facilitated by underwriter i in year 
t+1(Δ_Mkt_Share_Amount i,t+1). Rep_Vari,t is the variable of interest and is designed to 
capture how well underwriter i has been able to price its offerings relative to its 
proposed prices over the previous two-year period.30 I measure this variable as either 
the percentage of underwriter i’s offerings that have been successfully completed 
(Public_Repi,t), the average pricing outcome of underwriter i’s offerings relative to the 
proposed pricing range (Range_Repi,t), or the average price revision of underwriter i’s 
successfully completed offerings (Revision_Repi,t).31 Following prior literature that 
suggests that initial returns negatively influence underwriter reputation (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Nanda and Yun, 1997), I also include Init_Return_Repi,t in my model which 
is defined as the average initial return of underwriter i’s offerings over the previous 
two-year period. 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 Table 9, Panel B provides the results from estimating Equation 5. This panel reveals 
that β1 is estimated to be positive and is statistically significant in each model. Focusing 
on Model 6, the economic magnitude of this finding suggests that a one standard 
deviation change in Revision_Rep is positively associated with a 0.5 percent change in an 
underwriter’s market share. Given that the average annual size of the IPO market was 
$15.3 billion in the U.S. during this sample period, a 0.5 percent change is equivalent to 
                                                        
30 I also perform my tests using one-year and three-year periods to capture the underwriter’s pricing reputation. 
For each of these alternative time periods, the results are qualitatively similar to those using the two-year period. 
31 Similar to the Range variable used in my prior analyses, the Range_Rep variable assigns the value of zero to 
firms that withdraw their offering, one to firms that price below the proposed pricing range, two to firms that 
price within the proposed pricing range, and three to firms that price above the proposed pricing range. 
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$76.5 million in proceeds. While prior theory alludes to this relationship, this is the first 
empirical evidence to my knowledge that underwriters incur reputational damage from 
marketing overpriced initial public offerings. 
6.2 Performance and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon 
 In Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1, I include firms’ initial returns (Init_Return) as one of the 
variables that captures the investor feedback received as part of the bookbuilding 
process. I include this as one of the investor feedback variables because the 
bookbuilding mechanism is designed to reward investors that reveal that their valuation 
exceeds the proposed valuation by only partially impounding their revealed 
information into the final offer price. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, all of the 
information must be impounded into the final offer price if investors’ valuations are 
below the proposed price in order for the market to clear. 
 This asymmetric response to the information revealed by investors suggests that the 
Performance variable should not continue to have explanatory power about firms’ initial 
returns if there was a negative price revision. Thus, I modify Equation 1 to include an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if there was a non-negative price revision 
(Revision_Pos), zero otherwise. I also include the interaction of this variable with the 
Performance variable in the modified equation. I provide the results of estimating this 
modified equation in Table 10. Consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon, 
Column 2 of Table 10 reports that the coefficient for the interaction variable is estimated 
to be positive and is statistically significant (t-stat = 2.45) while the main effect for 
Performance is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 0.34). Also, we observe that the inclusion 
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of the interaction reduces the coefficient for the Revision_Pos variable. This attenuating 
effect provides further evidence that the Performance variable represented a portion of 
the information revealed about the value of IPO firms that was not included in the final 
offer price. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
This study examines how accounting information influences investors’ evaluations of 
IPO firms. Prior research has attempted to answer this question by examining how an 
IPO firm’s accounting information relates to its final offer price. However, a research 
design using price levels is unable to disentangle whether investors are using the firm’s 
accounting information or simply relying on the underwriter’s proposed valuation. To 
overcome this limitation, I examine the investor feedback provided to underwriters after 
the underwriters have proposed a valuation for the offering.  
 I predict and find that an accounting-based signal about the future prospects of IPO 
firms is not fully captured in the price that the underwriter proposes for the offering 
and that investors use the bookbuilding process to adjust the proposed price to more 
fully reflect this information. I also show that investors’ use of this accounting 
information improves the accuracy of IPO pricing. Finally, I show that this information 
is more likely to be fully impounded into the final offer price when there is greater 
participation from institutional investors in the bookbuilding process. These findings 
highlight the value that investors associate with an IPO firm’s accounting information 
and reveal that the price revision is much more predictable than suggested by the extant 
literature.
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Figure 1. IPO Timeline 
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Figure 2. Mean Investor Feedback by Performance 
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Figure 3. Mean BHAR by Performance 
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Table 1. Final Sample 
 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel details my sample selection process and reports the final number of firms included in 
my empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
Panel B. Sample Distribution 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel details the distribution of my final sample reporting both the year and Fama-
French 12 industry classification. 
  
Details Observations
SDC Platinum listing of U.S. firms that filed their original IPOs during 2001 - 2007, 
excluding unit offers, ADR's, carve-outs/spin-offs, reverse LBOs, partnerships, 
hedge funds (SIC code 6726), and firms filing on foreign exchanges.
938
     Less:  Financial firms (SIC code 6000 - 6999) 142
     Less:  IPO firms with incomplete data 98
Final Sample 698
Industry Classification 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Consumer Non-Durables 0 1 3 3 5 4 1 17
Consumer Durables 0 1 3 2 5 3 3 17
Manufacturing 2 1 3 1 12 9 6 34
Oil & Gas 2 2 1 3 11 13 7 39
Chemicals 0 0 1 6 3 8 1 19
Business Equipment 9 15 12 46 34 26 34 176
Telecommunications 0 1 3 5 8 5 7 29
Utilities 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 7
Wholesale 4 9 6 20 16 17 8 80
Healthcare 12 15 12 46 31 37 40 193
Other 6 9 12 18 12 12 18 87
Total 36 54 56 152 138 134 128 698
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for IPO firms 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel provides descriptive statistics for my sample of firms. The data used in this 
study is collected from a variety of sources including COMPUSTAT, CRSP, the SEC EDGAR 
database and Jay Ritter’s IPO Database. Each variable is motivated in Section 3 and is defined in 
Appendix A. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3
Initial 510 12.67 0.87 12.26 12.63 13.15
Offer 510 12.60 0.93 12.03 12.60 13.16
Secondary 510 12.70 0.99 12.11 12.68 13.34
Public 698 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00
Range 698 1.43 1.04 0.00 2.00 2.00
Range 510 1.95 0.66 2.00 2.00 2.00
Revision 510 -0.05 0.20 -0.18 0.00 0.08
Init_Return 510 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.08 0.23
Tot_Revision 510 0.09 0.38 -0.17 0.04 0.29
BHAR 510 -0.01 0.36 -0.28 -0.06 0.21
Performance 698 3.56 1.56 2.00 4.00 5.00
Book_Value 698 -0.11 3.94 -3.87 -0.76 3.58
Book_Value_Post 510 2.75 3.30 2.22 3.86 4.77
EBIT 698 0.45 3.00 -2.49 0.91 3.16
Abs(EBIT) 698 5.34 2.70 3.50 5.51 7.05
CFO 698 0.77 2.85 -2.21 1.34 3.25
Revenues 698 3.99 2.17 2.68 4.21 5.58
R&D 698 1.29 1.31 0.00 1.15 3.25
Leverage 698 1.56 1.41 0.70 1.02 2.02
Risk_Factors 698 3.54 0.25 3.37 3.56 3.71
Auditor 698 0.88 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00
Insider 510 0.33 0.14 0.28 0.36 0.42
Filing_Amount 698 4.51 0.85 3.93 4.44 4.99
Underwriter 698 7.77 1.71 7.00 8.50 9.00
Mkt_Ret 698 16.11 26.86 -0.88 16.21 33.10
Mkt_Comp 698 73.58 10.95 69.05 73.68 80.00
Mid_Price 510 14.33 6.63 12.00 14.00 16.00
IPO_Price 510 13.69 6.34 10.00 13.00 17.00
BM 510 0.23 0.33 0.03 0.18 0.37
CRSP 510 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.08
Full Sample
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Continued 
 
 
Panel B. Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables) 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in my study. Each variable is motivated in Section 3 
and is defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Performance 1
2 Book_Value 0.26 1
3 Book_Value_Post 0.19 1 1
4 EBIT 0.48 0.49 0.39 1
5 Abs(EBIT) -0.02 0.15 0.08 0.32 1
6 CFO 0.49 0.43 0.35 0.81 0.24 1
7 Revenues 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.77 0.37 0.74 1
8 R&D -0.26 -0.39 -0.31 -0.48 0.02 -0.39 -0.40 1
9 Leverage -0.32 -0.66 -0.64 -0.44 -0.09 -0.41 -0.44 0.34 1
10 Risk_Factors -0.06 -0.16 -0.12 -0.28 -0.12 -0.23 -0.25 0.27 0.11 1
11 Auditor -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.20 -0.01 0.10 0.19 0.10 -0.03 1
12 Insider 0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 0.12 0.03 0.06 0 1
13 Filing_Amount 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.63 -0.13 -0.25 -0.07 0.22 -0.08 1
14 Underwriter 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.18 0.34 0.21 -0.12 0.11 0.44 0.04 0.58 1
15 Mkt_Ret -0.12 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.16 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.09 1
16 Mkt_Comp -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 1
17 Mid_Price 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.31 0.40 0.28 0.35 -0.03 -0.16 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.49 0.31 -0.05 0.00 1
18 IPO_Price 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.45 -0.13 -0.19 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.64 0.36 0.05 -0.06 0.88 1
19 BM 0.11 0.73 0.73 0.36 0.08 0.37 0.33 -0.32 -0.56 -0.11 -0.10 -0.17 0.20 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.12 1
20 CRSP -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.20 0.00 -0.05 -0.01
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Table 3. The Performance Variable 
 
Panel A. Performance Variable Construction 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel details the construction of the Performance variable including the mean 
value for each of the individual fundamental signals included in the variable’s 
construction. Additional information about the Performance variable and each of the 
individual fundamental signals included therein is included in Section 3.2. 
 
 
 
Signal Information Content Score = +1 Mean
Δ CFO Operating Cash Flow Increase 0.58
Δ EBIT Profitability Increase 0.62
Δ GM Gross Margin Increase 0.48
Δ AT Asset Turnover Increase 0.70
Δ PP&E Fixed Capital Increase 0.67
Δ LEV Leverage Decrease 0.50
Non-Increase
Non-Decrease
Non-Increase
Score = 0
Non-Increase
Non-Increase
Non-Increase
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Table 3. The Performance Variable, Continued 
 
 
Panel B. Pearson Correlations (Dependent Variables) 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the individual fundamental signals that comprise the Performance 
variable and each of the dependent variables that are used in my study. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A. 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Public 1
2 Range 0.84 1
3 Revision . 0.70 0.70 1
4 Init_Return . 0.45 0.45 0.47 1
5 Tot_Revision . 0.68 0.68 0.86 0.84 1
6 Initial . 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.15 1
7 Offer . 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.21 0.34 0.97 1
8 Secondary . 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.94 0.98 1
9 BHAR . -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 1
10 Performance 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.14 1
11 Δ CFO 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.61 1
12 Δ EBIT 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.09 0.71 0.46 1
13 Δ GM 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.61 0.24 0.44 1
14 Δ AT 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.50 0.21 0.29 0.16 1
15 Δ PP&E 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.33 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.00 1
16 Δ LEV 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.45 0.09 0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.15
 55 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Investor Feedback and IPO Valuation 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Investor Feedback 
 
 
 
Notes: This table reports pooled regressions using several dependent variables that capture the investor 
feedback received during the bookbuilding portion of the IPO process. Performance is the primary variable 
of interest for this table and is predicted to be positive. All variables are motivated in Section 3 and are 
defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Public Range Revision Init_Return Tot_Revision
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Performance + 0.1507*** 0.1647*** 0.0325*** 0.0245*** 0.0636***
(3.43) (5.12) (5.22) (4.04) (6.33)
Book_Value 0.0225 -0.0002 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0057
(0.92) (-0.02) (-1.48) (-0.66) (-1.21)
EBIT 0.0461 0.0148 0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0009
(1.32) (0.63) (0.51) (-0.34) (-0.09)
Abs_EBIT 0.0126 -0.0472** -0.0208*** -0.0134*** -0.0358***
(0.40) (-2.10) (-6.12) (-2.76) (-5.33)
CFO -0.0149 -0.0463** -0.0141*** -0.0124* -0.0273**
(-0.43) (-2.02) (-2.81) (-1.70) (-2.47)
Revenues 0.0302 0.0061 -0.0036 0.0051 0.0023
(0.63) (0.21) (-0.52) (0.71) (0.19)
R&D 0.0532 0.0087 -0.0073 0.0008 -0.0050
(0.89) (0.26) (-0.99) (0.11) (-0.43)
Leverage 0.1337** 0.0447 0.0067 0.0020 0.0104
(2.12) (1.20) (0.94) (0.20) (0.65)
Risk_Factors 0.1324 0.0764 0.0221 -0.0205 0.0322
(0.45) (0.37) (0.55) (-0.53) (0.45)
Auditor -0.3488* -0.2473* -0.0337 -0.0220 -0.0581
(-1.70) (-1.96) (-1.46) (-0.76) (-1.30)
Filing_Amount -0.4603*** 0.0598 0.1978*** 0.0491** 0.3000***
(-3.73) (0.66) (10.40) (2.34) (9.19)
Underwriter 0.0539 0.0206 -0.0100 0.0193** 0.0084
(0.99) (0.64) (-1.35) (2.35) (0.58)
Mkt_Ret 0.0141*** 0.0110*** 0.0012*** 0.0008** 0.0020***
(5.21) (7.59) (4.42) (2.09) (3.29)
Mkt_Comp 0.0330*** 0.0135*** -0.0016** -0.0018** -0.0037***
(4.94) (3.16) (-2.05) (-2.38) (-2.67)
Mid_Price -0.0056*** -0.0089***
(-3.81) (-3.00)
IPO_Price 0.0034
(1.60)
Underwriter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 698 698 510 510 510
Adjusted R-Squared - 0.1501 0.4216 0.1369 0.3339
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1799 - - - -
Predicted 
Sign
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Table 4. Determinants of Investor Feedback and IPO Valuation, Continued 
 
 
Panel B. Determinants of IPO Valuation 
 
 
 
Notes: This table reports pooled log-linear regressions where the dependent 
variables represent the natural log of firm value at each stage of the IPO 
pricing process. Performance is the primary variable of interest for this table 
and is predicted to be positive. All variables are motivated in Section 3 and 
are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Initial Offer Secondary
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Performance + 0.0122 0.0366** 0.0580***
(0.68) (2.00) (2.76)
Book_Value_Post + 0.0239** 0.0260** 0.0249**
(2.36) (2.47) (2.21)
EBIT - -0.0114 -0.0141 -0.0130
(-0.50) (-0.60) (-0.51)
Abs_EBIT + 0.1082*** 0.0986*** 0.0942***
(8.70) (7.71) (6.53)
CFO + 0.0468** 0.0406** 0.0289
(2.44) (2.00) (1.21)
Revenues + 0.0691*** 0.0956*** 0.1073***
(2.68) (3.36) (3.55)
R&D + 0.0851*** 0.0608** 0.0610**
(3.25) (2.24) (2.04)
Leverage + 0.0208 0.0436 0.0455
(0.91) (1.58) (1.64)
Risk_Factors + 0.2003 0.2075 0.1856
(1.52) (1.41) (1.17)
Auditor ? -0.1301 -0.1917** -0.2189**
(-1.55) (-2.08) (-2.33)
Underwriter + 0.1395*** 0.1499*** 0.1725***
(7.10) (6.65) (6.93)
Insider + 0.1215 0.2198 0.2861*
(0.81) (1.45) (1.71)
Underwriter Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Observations 510 510 510
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6841 0.6604 0.6142
Predicted 
Sign
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Table 5. The Differential Impact of Performance on Investor Feedback 
  
 
 
Notes: This table reports regressions partitioned by the R&D intensity of the issuing firms. Low (High) Quality represents the top quartile 
(bottom three quartiles) of R&D intensive firms in my sample. For each partition, I estimate OLS regressions using several dependent variables 
that capture the price changes that occur during the bookbuilding portion of the IPO process. The difference between the coefficient estimated 
for the Performance variable for the Low Quality partition and the coefficient estimated for the Performance variable for the High Quality partition 
is the primary variable of interest for this table and is predicted to be negative. All variables are motivated in Section 3 and are defined in 
Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) (8)
Variables
Low 
Quality
High 
Quality
Low 
Quality
High 
Quality
Low 
Quality
High 
Quality
Low 
Quality
High 
Quality
Low 
Quality
High 
Quality
Performance -0.1180 0.1350*** 0.0416 0.1698*** 0.0287** 0.0378*** -0.0067 0.0340*** 0.0322 0.0805***
(-0.80) (2.91) (0.57) (4.99) (2.30) (5.58) (-0.47) (4.73) (1.57) (6.77)
Diff of βPerformance
=Low - High Quality
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 176 522 176 522 122 388 122 388 122 388
Adjusted R-Squared - - 0.1806 0.1277 0.7189 0.2758 0.2208 0.1006 0.6229 0.2040
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3982 0.1052 - - - - - - - -
Predicted 
Sign
Public Range
- t-statistic: -1.65* t-statistic: -1.68*
Revision Init_Return Tot_Revision
t-statistic: -0.68 t-statistic: -2.65*** t-statistic: -2.00**
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Table 6. Performance and Post-IPO Stock Returns 
  
Panel A: Distribution of BHAR by Performance 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) earned from 
portfolios of IPO firms based on values of Performance. Each firm’s abnormal return is measured 
for 180 days from the closing market price on its first day of trading. I adjust each IPO firm’s 
gross returns for its size and risk using its Fama-French 10x10 portfolio formed on its market 
value of equity and book-to-market ratio. High (Low) Performance firms include those with 
values greater than 4 (less than 2). The mean return on the ‘High – Low’ portfolio is equal to the 
weighted average of a portfolio that is long (short) firms with high (low) values of Performance. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
All Firms
n Mean Q25 Median Q75 % Positive
Sample 510 -0.014 -0.276 -0.055 0.212 0.424
Performance
0 11 -0.180 -0.307 -0.162 -0.003 0.091
1 43 -0.040 -0.293 -0.183 0.127 0.326
2 64 -0.066 -0.328 -0.081 0.174 0.406
3 96 -0.057 -0.337 -0.117 0.130 0.365
4 116 -0.026 -0.282 -0.078 0.204 0.414
5 122 0.023 -0.251 -0.003 0.226 0.492
6 58 0.115 -0.100 0.110 0.345 0.586
Low Performance 54 -0.068 -0.303 -0.172 0.036 0.278
High Performance 180 0.052 -0.228 0.024 0.264 0.522
 = High - Low 234 0.056 -0.105 0.058 0.195 0.568
t-statistic - 2.41** - 2.30** - -
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Table 6. Performance and Post-IPO Stock Returns, Continued 
 
 Panel B: Determinants of BHAR 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports pooled OLS regressions where the 
dependent variable is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) measured for 180 days from the closing market price 
on firms’ first day of trading on the secondary market. 
Performance is the primary variable of interest for this table. 
All variables are motivated in Section 3 and are defined in 
Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2)
Performance + 0.0336*** 0.0259*
(2.83) (1.96)
CRSP + 0.8770***
(2.81)
BM + 0.1165**
(2.07)
Secondary + 0.0138
(0.44)
Tot_Revision - -0.0238
(-0.44)
EBIT + 0.0004*
(1.67)
Underwriter + 0.0240**
(2.18)
Filing_Amount ? -0.0003**
(-2.00)
Observations 510 510
R-squared 0.0188 0.0669
Predicted 
Sign
BHAR
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Table 7. The Differential Impact of Performance on Post-IPO Stock Returns 
 
Panel A: Performance-based Trading Strategy by Investor Sophistication 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) earned from portfolios of IPO firms 
based on values of Performance. The results are partitioned by whether the offering was facilitated by a top-tier 
underwriter. High (Low) Info Processing indicates that the average updated Carter Manaster ranking for the lead 
underwriters facilitating the offering is greater than (less than) 8. High (Low) Performance firms include those with 
values greater than 4 (less than 2). The mean return on the ‘High – Low’ portfolio is equal to the weighted average of 
a portfolio that is long (short) firms with high (low) values of Performance. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
n Mean Median Positive n Mean Median Positive
Sample 352 0.007 -0.039 0.449 158 -0.059 -0.085 0.354
Low Performance 28 -0.021 -0.188 0.286 26 -0.119 -0.142 0.192
High Performance 132 0.036 -0.007 0.477 48 0.099 0.090 0.563
= High - Low 160 0.033 0.018 0.513 74 0.106 0.114 0.635
t-statistic - 1.226 0.977 - - 2.381** 2.524** -
High Info Processing Low Info Processing
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Table 7. The Differential Impact of Performance on Post-IPO Stock Returns, Continued 
 
 
Panel B: The Differential Impact of Performance on Secondary Market Abnormal Returns by Investor Sophistication 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) earned from 
portfolios of IPO firms based on values of Performance. The OLS regressions are partitioned 
by whether or not a top-tier underwriter facilitated the offering. High (Low) Info Processing 
indicates that the average updated Carter Manaster ranking for the lead underwriters 
facilitating the offering is greater than (less than) 8. The difference between the coefficient 
estimated for the Performance variable for the High Information Processing partition and the 
coefficient estimated for the Performance variable for the Low Information Processing 
partition is the primary variable of interest for this table and is predicted to be negative. All 
variables are motivated in Section 3 and are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
High Info 
Processing
Low Info 
Processing
High Info 
Processing
Low Info 
Processing
Performance 0.0189 0.0527*** 0.0181 0.0452**
(1.45) (3.23) (1.23) (2.15)
Difference of βPerformance
=High - Low Info Processing
Remaining Controls Excluded Excluded Included Included
Observations 352 158 352 158
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0034 0.0491 0.0209 0.1811
– t-statistic: -1.97** t-statistic: -1.38
BHAR
Predicted 
Sign
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Table 8. Alternative Measures of Performance 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports the estimated coefficients from running Equations 1,2, and 4 using eight alternative measures of the Performance variable. 
Each measure uses an alternative combination of the six fundamental signals included in the original Performance variable. Specifically, the measures 
are computed as follows: Performance1 = Performance - Δ AT; Performance2 = Performance - Δ Lev; Performance3 = Performance - Δ PP&E; Performance4 = 
Performance - Δ CFO; Performance5 = Performance - Δ GM; and Performance6 = Performance - Δ EBIT. The final two alternative measures are built to allow 
for variation in the individual fundamental signals. Specifically, Performance7 assigns values to each firm based on the realization of its fundamental 
signals in comparison to the prior year’s decile cutoffs. It then sums these decile rankings to form the aggregate performance measure. Performance8 
ranks the continuous realization for each fundamental signal for the entire cross section of firms (ranks 1-698) and sums the ranks together to form the 
aggregate measure. Each of the coefficients estimated using these eight alternative measures is predicted to be positive for all nine dependent 
variables examined in this paper. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variables Public Range Revision Init_Return Tot_Revision Initial Offer Secondary BHAR
Performance 1 0.1737*** 0.1787*** 0.0327*** 0.0220*** 0.0611*** 0.0194 0.0427** 0.0621** 0.0271*
(3.94) (5.06) (4.83) (3.16) (5.56) (1.02) (2.14) (2.62) (1.76)
Performance 2 0.1773*** 0.1721*** 0.0334*** 0.0232*** 0.0618*** 0.0079 0.0354* 0.0578** 0.0301*
(3.86) (5.10) (4.86) (3.28) (5.33) (0.38) (1.66) (2.34) (1.97)
Performance 3 0.1537*** 0.1618*** 0.0334*** 0.0205*** 0.0600*** 0.0154 0.0424** 0.0642*** 0.0288**
(3.24) (4.75) (5.04) (3.00) (5.47) (0.80) (2.11) (2.85) (2.02)
Performance 4 0.1393*** 0.1599*** 0.0324*** 0.0272*** 0.0674*** 0.0212 0.0441** 0.0665*** 0.0235*
(2.61) (4.19) (4.45) (3.82) (5.31) (1.00) (2.05) (2.79) (1.67)
Performance 5 0.1534*** 0.1915*** 0.0402*** 0.0370*** 0.0859*** 0.0245 0.0565*** 0.0891*** 0.0358**
(2.86) (5.22) (5.56) (4.82) (6.98) (1.24) (2.71) (3.70) (2.57)
Performance 6 0.1492*** 0.1807*** 0.0344*** 0.0261*** 0.0686*** 0.0141 0.0379* 0.0595** 0.0369***
(2.76) (4.55) (4.80) (3.91) (5.82) (0.70) (1.84) (2.52) (2.62)
Performance 7 0.0210*** 0.0225*** 0.0046*** 0.0042*** 0.0098*** 0.0072*** 0.0109*** 0.0150*** 0.0055**
(2.79) (3.92) (4.34) (3.20) (5.21) (2.37) (3.57) (4.34) (2.52)
Performance 8 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001**
(2.79) (4.17) (4.71) (3.24) (5.42) (2.31) (3.50) (4.12) (2.31)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Underwriter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Excluded
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Excluded
Observations 698 698 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
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Table 9. The Reputational Effects of Marketing Overpriced Securities 
  
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports descriptive statistics for variables used to examine the 
reputational effects of certifying prices in excess of the final offer price as described in 
Section 6.1. This sample consists of IPOs of U.S. industrials filed with the SEC from 2001 – 
2011. My sample is obtained from the Global New Issues Database within Thomson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum and excludes unit offers, ADRs, carve-outs/spin-offs, reverse 
LBOs, partnerships, financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), and filings of less than $10 
million. All variables are motivated in Section 6.1 and are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3
Δ_Mkt_Share_Count 511 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Δ_Mkt_Share_Amount 511 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01
Public_Rep 511 0.74 0.36 0.63 1.00 1.00
Range_Rep 511 1.41 0.78 1.00 1.61 2.00
Revision_Rep 511 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.00
Init_Return_Rep 511 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.11
Full Sample
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Table 9. The Reputational Effects of Marketing Overpriced Securities, Continued 
 
 
Panel B. Reputational Effects of Marketing Overpriced Securities 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports pooled OLS regressions using two different dependent variables that are 
designed to capture the changes in an underwriter’s annual market share. Public_Rep, Range_Rep, and  
Revision_Rep are the primary variables of interest in this table and are each predicted to be positive. All 
variables are motivated in Section 6.1 and are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public_Rep + 0.0124*** 0.0097*
(3.30) (1.80)
Range_Rep + 0.0088*** 0.0074***
(4.73) (2.92)
Revision_Rep + 0.0466*** 0.0408**
(3.57) (2.52)
Init_Return_Rep - -0.0152 -0.0246* -0.0216* -0.0158 -0.0240 -0.0219
(-1.22) (-1.89) (-1.65) (-1.01) (-1.46) (-1.32)
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511
R-squared 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.007
Predicted 
Sign
Δ_Mkt_Share_Count Δ_Mkt_Share_Amount
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Table 10. Performance and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon 
 
 
 
Notes: This panel reports pooled OLS regressions examining firms’ initial returns 
(Init_Return). The variable of interest is the interaction of Performance and Revision_Pos 
which is predicted to be positive. All variables are motivated in Section 6.2 and are defined 
in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.
Init_Return Init_Return
Variables (1) (2)
Performance * Revision_Pos + 0.0260**
(2.45)
Performance + 0.0163*** ? 0.0025
(2.78) (0.34)
Revision_Pos + 0.1309*** + 0.0331
(5.90) (0.70)
Remaining Control Variables Included Included
Underwriter Fixed Effects Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Observations 510 510
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2034 0.2105
Predicted 
Sign
Predicted 
Sign
 66 
 
Appendices 
 67 
 
Appendix A: Measurement of Variables32 
 
Δ AT: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s asset turnover ratio 
(AT) increased year-over-year during the two years preceding the firm’s IPO. A firm’s 
asset turnover ratio is calculated as its annual revenues divided by its two-year average 
assets.  
 
Δ CFO: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s cash flow from 
operations (CFO) increased year-over-year during the two years preceding the firm’s 
IPO.  
 
Δ EBIT: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s earnings before 
income and taxes (EBIT) increased year-over-year during the two years preceding the 
firm’s IPO.  
 
Δ GM: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s gross margin ratio 
(GM) increased year-over-year during the two years preceding the firm’s IPO. A firm’s 
gross margin ratio is calculated as its annual revenues minus its cost of goods sold all 
divided by its annual revenues. 
 
Δ LEV: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s leverage (LEV) 
decreased during the two years prior to the IPO. A firm’s leverage is calculated as the 
sum of its total liabilities and its carrying value of preferred stock all divided by its total 
assets. 
 
Δ PP&E: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer’s net property, plant, 
and equipment (PP&E) assets increased year-over-year during the two years preceding 
the firm’s IPO.   
 
Δ_Mkt_Share_Amount: The percentage change in the dollar amount of the offerings 
facilitated by underwriter i in year t+1 relative to year t. 
 
Δ_Mkt_Share_Count: The percentage change in the number of offerings facilitated by 
underwriter i in year t+1 relative to year t.. 
 
Abs(EBIT): The natural log of one plus the absolute value of the firm’s earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) for the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
 
                                                        
32 As motivated in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, I use a log transformation process to many of the variables 
included in the study. This transformation consists of taking the log of (1+value) for all positive values and 
the –log (1-value) for negative values. This process is used to retain the negative values included in the 
original data while also maintaining the monotonic relationship that exists among the realized values.  
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Auditor: An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the issuer’s prior year 
financial statements were audited by either Arthur Anderson, Deloitte Touché, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, or PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
 
BHAR: The firm’s buy-and-hold returns for 180 calendar days from the end of a firm’s 
first day of trading on the secondary market less the buy-and-hold return of the firm’s 
Fama-French 10x10 portfolio over this same time period. The Fama-French 10x10 
portfolio is designed to adjust for abnormal returns associated with firm size (market 
value of equity) and risk (book to market ratio).  
 
BM: The firm’s book-to-market ratio calculated immediately following its IPO. This is 
calculated as Book_Value_Post divided by Secondary. 
 
Book_Value: The log transformation the firm’s book value prior to IPO. The firm’s book 
value prior to IPO is calculated as the firm’s total assets minus the sum of its total 
liabilities and the carrying value of its preferred stock.  
 
Book_Value_Post: The log transformation of the firm’s book value following its IPO. The 
firm’s book value following its IPO is calculated as the sum of its total assets and IPO 
proceeds minus the sum of its total liabilities and the carrying value of its preferred 
stock. 
 
CFO: The log transformation of the firm’s cash flow from operations (CFO) for the fiscal 
year prior to IPO.  
 
CRSP: The CRSP value-weighted return measured for 180 days after each firm’s first 
day of trading on the secondary market. 
  
EBIT: The log transformation of the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for 
the fiscal year prior to IPO.  
 
Filing_Amount: The natural log of one plus the amount of proceeds (in millions) raised 
from the IPO. 
 
Init_Return: The percentage change in price at the end of the first day of trading on the 
secondary market and the final offer price. 
 
Init_Return_Rep: The average initial return of underwriter i’s offerings over the previous 
two-year period. 
 
Initial: The natural log of one plus the firm’s total market value calculated as the number 
of post-IPO shares multiplied by the price proposed for the IPO. 
 
Insider: The percentage of post-IPO shares held by the firm’s executives and directors. 
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IPO_Price: The amount of proceeds received by an IPO firm for each of its securities. 
 
Leverage: The firm’s leverage ratio calculated as the sum of its total liabilities and the 
carrying value of its preferred stock all divided by its total assets. All values are taken 
from the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
 
Mid_Price: The middle point of the initial pricing range provided in the issuer’s 
registration statement filed with the SEC. 
 
Mkt_Comp: The percentage of the total IPOs that were successfully completed between 
the day that the firm filed its initial registration statement with the SEC and the IPO 
date. 
 
Mkt_Ret: The CRSP value-weighted return for the period between the date that the firm 
files its initial registration statement with the SEC and the IPO date. 
 
Offer: The natural log of one plus the firm’s total market value calculated as the number 
of post-IPO shares multiplied by the final offer price. 
 
Performance: A composite score variable that sums the values of the following six binary 
signals: is a composite score variable that sums the values of Δ CFO, Δ EBIT, Δ GM, Δ 
AT, Δ PP&E, and Δ LEV. 
 
Public: An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s offering is successfully 
completed, 0 otherwise. 
 
Public_Rep: The percentage of underwriter i’s offerings that have been successfully 
completed over the previous two-year period. 
  
Range: An ordinal variable that takes the value of 0 to firms that withdraw their offering, 
1 to firms that price below the initial range, 2 to firms that price within the initial range, 
and 3 to firms that price above the initial range. 
 
Range_Rep: The average pricing outcome (Range) of underwriter i’s offerings relative to 
the proposed pricing range over the previous two-year period. 
 
R&D: The natural log of one plus the firm’s annual research and development expense 
(R&D) for the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
 
Revenues: The natural log of one plus the firm’s annual revenues for the fiscal year prior 
to IPO. 
 
Revision: The percentage change in price between the final offer price and the midpoint 
of the initial pricing range. 
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Revision_Pos: An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s price revision 
(Revision) is non-negative. 
 
Risk_Factors: The natural log of one plus the number of risk factors included in the 
issuer’s initial registration statement that it filed with the SEC. 
 
Secondary: The natural log of one plus the firm’s total market value calculated as the 
number of post-IPO shares multiplied by the closing price on the firm’s first day of 
trading. 
 
Tot_Revision: The percentage change in price between the price at the end of the first day 
of trading on the secondary market and the midpoint of the initial pricing range. 
 
Underwriter: The average Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation, obtained from Jay 
Ritter’s data library, for the lead underwriters in the year of IPO. 
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Appendix B: The Underwriter Selection Process 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a description of the underwriter selection 
process which is commonly referred to as the “IPO bake-off”. The competitiveness of 
this process is suggested to lead underwriters to commit to marketing IPO firms at 
excessively high valuations. While the IPO bake-off is not publicly observable, this 
appendix provides commentary about this process and the competitive pressure that 
exists therein.  
 
Dwyer, R. (2012). Brazil: Time to go back to IPO textbook? Euromoney March, 2012. Web. 
May 6, 2014. 
The temptation, they say, for one bank to high-ball the valuation to win 
the mandate is irresistible. It’s a symptom of an over-banked market, say 
some, who think rationalization would help. There are too many banks 
chasing the same deals and, during the bake-off, how better to 
differentiate yourself with the client than to say: "You should get P + 
10%"? 
 
Turner, G. (2012). Independent advisors remain on watch during IPOs. Financial News 
October 8, 2012. Web. May 6, 2014. 
Companies and their advising banks have one figure in mind and then 
blame the state of the market when selling the shares to picky investors at 
a much lower price. 
 
Announcing that it had pulled its IPO in mid-September, Talanx said: 
“Investor feedback on the company’s valuation deviated significantly 
from the estimated minimum fair value that had been communicated to 
Talanx by the investment banks managing the transaction.” 
 
Tuttle, K. (2011). Investment banking is not investment research. Research 2.0 October, 
18, 2011. Web. May 6, 2014. 
At [the bake-off], a company like Groupon invites all the banks to come 
and do a dog and pony show with the senior management team to prove 
how valuable they would be as an underwriter. They are not in evaluation 
mode, they are in selling mode. Much like a courtship, the banks are 
invited by the company to “show how much they love them.” Only one 
suitor gets to be the lead bank (although in large deals there can be two or 
three)…A key part of the process is where banks provide a “valuation 
estimate” for where the shares should be priced and expect to trade. This 
is the most absurd part of the process because the banks all try and find 
the highest number. 
 
  
72 
 
Sorkin, A. R. (2011). The missed red flags on Groupon. New York Times October 17, 2011. 
Web. May 6, 2014. 
If it were to really slow its marketing spending, it is possible Groupon 
could turn a profit. Even so, it does not fully explain how Groupon’s 
underwriters, whose endorsement of the company is supposed to be 
considered the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, originally came up 
with Groupon’s questionable $30 billion valuation. 
 
Useem, J. (1998). All dressed up and No IPO. Inc. February, 1, 1998. Web. May 6, 2014. 
Robertson Stephens was "less enthusiastic" than Goldman about the 
valuation. But Robertson Stephens may have been reluctant to express 
hesitation, given that a number of other investment banks were trying to 
get in on the potentially remunerative deal, and Robertson may have 
risked losing its exclusive position as the deal's co-manager. 
 
Hughes, A. (2013). Union forces Chrysler towards IPO. International Financing Review 
October, 23 2013. Web. May 6, 2014. 
The choice of JP Morgan as sole bookrunner on the IPO is controversial as 
rival bankers claim that [JP Morgan] proposed the lowest valuation 
during pitching. “It’s perverse. The whole thing is a charade,” said one 
industrial banker of the IPO bake-off. “In a normal world, it wouldn’t 
make sense to go after a low valuation.” 
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